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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
The following scholars are experts on the history 
and original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Amici have published books or law review articles on 
the subject and teach courses in constitutional law, 
criminal procedure, and other topics:   
Danielle Citron, Morton & Sophia Macht Professor 
of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law 
Morgan Cloud, Charles Howard Candler Professor 
of Law, Emory University 
Bradford Colbert, Resident Adjunct Professor, 
Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
Dr. William Cuddihy, Adjunct Associate Professor 
of History, Los Angeles City College 
Laura K. Donohue, Professor of Law, Georgetown 
Law 
Norman M. Garland, Professor of Law, Southwest-
ern Law School 
David Gray, Professor of Law, University of Mary-
land Carey School of Law 
Margaret Hu, Assistant Professor of Law, Wash-
ington and Lee University School of Law 
                                            
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief and their 
letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk.  Under Rule 37.6 
of the Rules of this Court, amici state that no counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party 
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation 
or submission of this brief.  No person other than amici or their 
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or sub-
mission. 
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Renée McDonald Hutchins, Jacob A. France Pro-
fessor of Public Interest Law, University of Maryland 
Carey School of Law 
Tracey Maclin, Professor of Law, Boston Univer-
sity School of Law 
Luke Milligan, Professor of Law, Louis D. 
Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville 
George C. Thomas III, Board of Governors Profes-
sor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr. Distin-
guished Scholar, Rutgers School of Law2 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Law enforcement officials wanted to learn where 
Petitioner Timothy Carpenter was at the time of cer-
tain robberies.  To figure that out, they obtained rec-
ords from his cellular service provider showing the 
movements of his cell phone.  Examining those rec-
ords, they were able to track Carpenter’s whereabouts 
over a four-month period. 
Obtaining and examining those records was a 
“search” in any normal sense of the word—a search of 
documents and a search for Carpenter and one of his 
personal effects.  It was therefore a “search” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  When the 
Amendment was ratified, to “search” meant to “exam-
ine,” “explore,” “look through,” “inquire,” “seek,” or “try 
to find.”  Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English 
Language (10th ed. 1792).  Nothing about the text of 
the Fourth Amendment, or the historical backdrop 
against which it was adopted, suggests that the term 
“search” should be construed more narrowly in that 
Amendment to mean only conduct violating “an actual 
                                            
2 Institution names are provided for purposes of affiliation only. 
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(subjective) expectation of privacy” that “society is pre-
pared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”  Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).  Plainly, by examining and looking through Car-
penter’s cell site location records to seek the wherea-
bouts of his person and phone, the government agents 
in this case conducted a “search.” 
 Entrusting government agents with unfettered 
discretion to conduct searches using cell site location 
information undermines Fourth Amendment rights.  
The Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches.”  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV (emphasis added).  The Framers chose that 
language deliberately.  It reflected the insecurity they 
suffered under the British at the hands of “writs of as-
sistance,” a form of general warrant that granted state 
agents broad discretion to search wherever they 
pleased.  Such arbitrary power was “unreasonable” to 
the Framers, being “against the reason of the common 
law,” Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amend-
ment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1270 (2016), and it was 
intolerable because of its oppressive impact on “the 
people” as a whole.  As emphasized in one of the semi-
nal English cases that inspired the Amendment, this 
kind of general power to search was “totally subversive 
of the liberty of the subject.”  Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. 
Rep. 489, 498 (1763).  James Otis’s famous speech de-
nouncing a colonial writ of assistance similarly con-
demned those writs as “the worst instrument of arbi-
trary power,” placing “the liberty of every man in the 
hands of every petty officer.”  James Otis, In Opposi-
tion to Writs of Assistance (1761), available at 
http://bartleby.com/268/8/9. 
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Thus, although those who drafted and ratified the 
Fourth Amendment could not have anticipated cell-
phone technology, they would have recognized the 
dangers inherent in any state claim of unlimited au-
thority to conduct searches for evidence of criminal ac-
tivity.  Cell site location information provides insight 
into where we go and what we do—potentially reveal-
ing one’s intimate relationships, hobbies, predilec-
tions, medical conditions, religious beliefs, and politi-
cal pursuits.  Because this information is constantly 
generated and can be retrieved by the government 
long after the activities it memorializes have taken 
place, unfettered government access to cell site loca-
tion information raises the specter of general searches 
and undermines the security of “the people.”   
The use of more primitive techniques to track a 
person’s movements, such as live visual surveillance 
in public spaces, does not pose the same threat to the 
security of the people.  Traditional methods require 
considerable time and resources, making their use lim-
ited and infrequent.  “The people” can therefore re-
main secure in their persons and effects against the 
fear that police might track their movements without 
a compelling reason to do so.  See United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“In the pre-computer age, the great-
est protections of privacy were neither constitutional 
nor statutory, but practical.”). 
Today, however, ubiquitous personal electronic de-
vices generate perpetual records of almost everyone’s 
movements, “mak[ing] long-term monitoring [of the 
people] relatively easy and cheap.”  Id.  These develop-
ments have fundamentally transformed the state’s ca-
pacity to track and monitor the people.  David Gray, 
The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Surveillance 124 
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(2017) (“[W]hat is troubling about life in our age of sur-
veillance is the prospect of living in a world where each 
of us and all of us are subject to the constant and real 
threat of broad and indiscriminate surveillance.”).  
And if left unchecked, such developments will “alter 
the relationship between citizen and government in a 
way that is inimical to democratic society.”  Jones, 565 
U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omit-
ted).   
Searches conducted using cell site location infor-
mation raise precisely this danger.  Today, “it is the 
person who is not carrying a cell phone . . . who is the 
exception,” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 
(2014), and “nearly three-quarters of smart phone us-
ers [have] report[ed] being within five feet of their 
phones most of the time.”  Id.  All of these “cell-phone 
user[s] must reveal [their] general location to a cell 
tower in order for the cellular service provider to con-
nect a call.”  Cert. Opp. 15 (emphasis added).  Because 
anyone who uses this basic tool of modern life has no 
choice but to create a perpetual digital trail of his or 
her movements, the rise of modern cell phones has ef-
fectively enabled “twenty-four hour surveillance of any 
citizen of this country.”  United States v. Knotts, 460 
U.S. 276, 283 (1983).  Unfettered government access to 
that data is incompatible with “a society which chooses 
to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from sur-
veillance.”  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 
(1948).   
Although the procedures set forth in the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”) may limit the govern-
ment’s access to cell site location information, see 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), the Act was passed long before ac-
cess to telephone records allowed comprehensive 
tracking of subscribers’ movements.  As a consequence, 
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the SCA does not require sufficiently rigorous justifi-
cations for government access to this revealing data.  
Neither does the Act adequately limit the breadth of 
searches conducted using cell site location infor-
mation.  That shortcoming is evident in this case, 
where investigators needed location information only 
for specific times and dates, Pet. App. 6a, but re-
quested and received location data covering more than 
four months, Pet’r Br. 6-7 & n.4; see Pet. App. 52a.  Be-
cause of these flaws, the SCA does not sufficiently 
guard against threats of unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  
ARGUMENT 
I. Seeking the Whereabouts of a Person or Her 
Effects by Examining Cell Site Location 
Information Is a “Search” 
A.  “Words in a constitution . . . are always to be 
given the meaning they have in common use, unless 
there are very strong reasons to the contrary.”  State 
of Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139, 147 (1886).  
“Ordinarily courts do not construe words used in the 
Constitution so as to give them a meaning more nar-
row than one which they had in the common parlance 
of the times in which the Constitution was written.”  
United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 
533, 539 (1944). 
“When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as 
now, to ‘search’ meant ‘[t]o look over or through for the 
purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine 
by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to 
search the wood for a thief.’”  Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (quoting Noah Webster, An 
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)); 
see Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, su-
pra (defining “search” as to “examine,” “explore,” “look 
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through,” “inquire,” “seek,” or “try to find” by “looking 
into every suspected place”).   
Nothing about the text of the Fourth Amendment 
or the historical context in which it was adopted sug-
gests that the word “searches” should be construed 
more narrowly in that Amendment.  The Fourth 
Amendment “was the founding generation’s response 
to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assis-
tance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers 
to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search 
for evidence of criminal activity,” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 
2494, “often to uncover papers that might be used to 
convict persons of libel.”  United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990); see Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886).  These quests for 
smuggled goods, seditious materials, and the people 
responsible were “searches” in the ordinary sense of 
the word—efforts to find persons and things.   
Nor was the word “search” reserved in eighteenth-
century America for activities that involved crossing 
the threshold of a home or business.  For example, the 
word had long been used to describe efforts by law en-
forcement to find people in public places.  See, e.g., 
Webster, supra (“to search the wood for a thief”); Wil-
liam Sheppard, The Offices of Constables, ch. 8, § 2 (4th 
ed. 1658) (“The Officer receiving a Hue and Cry after 
a Fellon, must, with all speed, make diligent pursuit, 
with Horse and Foot, after the offendors from Town to 
Town the way it is sent, and make diligent search in 
his own Town.”); The Conductor Generalis: or, the Of-
fice, Duty, and Authority of Justices of the Peace 187-
88 (1792) (noting the authority of a constable or sheriff 
to “search in his town for suspected persons” and ad-
vising that “it is a good course to have the warrant of 
a justice of the peace, when time will permit, in order 
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to prevent causeless hue and cry”); William J. Cud-
dihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original 
Meaning 602–1791, at 320 (2009) (citing English mag-
istrate’s order commanding officers “to make diligent 
search” for able-bodied vagrants (quoting Order, 17 
Jan. 1705/6 in 3 Buckinghamshire Sessions Records 
(Le Hardy ed., 1939))); id. at 322 (citing English mag-
istrates’ report describing “Rogues, Vagabonds, sturdy 
Beggars, and disorderly Persons apprehended by vir-
tue of search Warrants[,] in Night Houses and other 
disorderly Houses or such as infest the Streets in the 
Night-time” (quoting Magistrate Report, in London J., 
at 2 (Apr. 24, 1731))). 
As it does today, the word “search” when used in 
1791 also encompassed the perusal and inspection of 
documents for the information they contained.  Indeed, 
the government’s pursuit of seditious writings was at 
the very heart of the English general warrant cases, 
those “landmarks” of freedom that were “applauded by 
the lovers of liberty in the colonies.”  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 
626.  In Entick v. Carrington, a case “undoubtedly fa-
miliar” to “every American statesman, during our rev-
olutionary and formative period as a nation,” id. at 
626, the King’s Bench rejected the notion that libelous 
materials “may be searched for and seized by whomso-
ever and wheresoever the Secretary of State thinks 
fit,” condemning general warrants to “enter a man’s 
house, search for and take away all his books and pa-
pers.”  Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 
(1765).  Pronouncing these searches unlawful, Lord 
Camden emphasized that the essence of the offense 
was not the physical confiscation of such documents, 
but rather state agents’ reading and examining them.  
Papers, he explained, are the owner’s “dearest prop-
erty,” which “will hardly bear an inspection.”  Id.  at 
1066.   
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B.  Eighteenth-century readers would not have re-
garded physical intrusions as necessary elements of 
the “searches” addressed in the Fourth Amendment.  
True, “[t]he text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its 
close connection to property, since otherwise . . . the 
phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ 
would have been superfluous.”  Jones, 565 U.S. at 405.  
But the same text reveals that the Amendment does 
more than simply protect those listed items from phys-
ical intrusion.  If that were the Amendment’s sole aim, 
it would merely prohibit “unreasonable searches of 
persons, houses, papers, and effects.”  Instead, it pro-
hibits violations of “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV (em-
phasis added).  And that “right . . . to be secure” can be 
violated by means other than a physical intrusion. 
In the material conditions of the eighteenth cen-
tury, few searches were capable of violating the secu-
rity of persons, houses, papers, or effects without also 
physically intruding upon them.  But even in the eight-
eenth century, jurists and statesmen who opposed gen-
eral warrants made clear that their concerns went be-
yond physical intrusion to include the dangers of the 
state accessing information and prying into personal 
matters. 
In the celebrated case Wilkes v. Wood, for instance, 
the plaintiff complained that his “papers had under-
gone the inspection of very improper persons to exam-
ine his private concerns,” and maintained that “of 
all offences that of a seizure of papers was the least 
capable of reparation; that, for other offences, an 
acknowledgement might make amends; but that for 
the promulgation of our most private concerns, affairs 
of the most secret personal nature, no reparation 
whatsoever could be made.”  98 Eng. Rep. at 498, 490.  
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In Entick v. Carrington, it was similarly charged that 
the defendants had “read over, pried into, and exam-
ined all the private papers, books, etc. of the plaintiff 
. . . whereby the secret affairs, etc. of the plaintiff be-
came wrongfully discovered.”  19 How. St. Tr. 1029.  
Pronouncing this conduct unlawful, Lord Camden ex-
plained that “the eye cannot by the laws of England be 
guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are re-
moved and carried away, the secret nature of those 
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass.”  Id. at 
1066. 
This Court later distilled the principles set forth in 
Entick, a case “in the minds of those who framed the 
fourth amendment to the constitution” and “consid-
ered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Boyd, 116 U.S. 
at 626-27.  “It is not the breaking of his doors, and the 
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the es-
sence of the offense,” this Court explained.  “The prin-
ciples laid down in this opinion,” reaching beyond “the 
concrete form of the case then before the court,” con-
demn “the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal 
security” and the “privacies of life” when “that right 
has never been forfeited by his conviction of some pub-
lic offense.”  Id. at 630; see Interstate Commerce 
Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894) (“the 
right of personal security . . . involves, not merely pro-
tection of [a] person from assault, but exemption of his 
private affairs . . . from the inspection and scrutiny of 
others”). 
In the eighteenth century, little information could 
be gained about the activities inside a home without 
entering it.  And because information could be memo-
rialized only on objects palpable to the touch, “[f]orce 
and violence were then the only means known” to 
wrest private knowledge from its possessor.  Olmstead 
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v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting).  But “science has brought forth far 
more effective devices” than those available at the 
Founding.  Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 
139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  Tools like thermal 
imagers and electronic trackers can acquire “infor-
mation regarding the interior of the home that could 
not otherwise have been obtained” without physical in-
trusion.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35; see United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984).  Modern equivalents of 
traditional “papers,” such as audio voice transmissions 
and electronic documents, can be obtained without 
physical intrusion because they are “intangible.”  
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285-86 
(6th Cir. 2010) (protecting email as “the technological 
scion of tangible mail”).  And as discussed below, digi-
tal innovations like cell site location information now 
enable the government to track the movements of the 
entire citizenry with an ease formerly unthinkable. 
C.  In sum, the meaning of “search” in the Found-
ing era—as today—included seeking the whereabouts 
of people and their effects as well as examining docu-
ments for the information they contained.  That defi-
nition plainly encompasses looking through cellular lo-
cation records in order to track the movements of a 
person and her effects.  “Whatever new methods of in-
vestigation may be devised” as technology advances, 
courts must “decide whether the action in question 
would have constituted a ‘search’ within the original 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  Jones, 565 U.S. 
at 406 n.3.  When the answer is ‘yes,’ “it is quite irrel-
evant whether there was an 18th-century analog.”  Id. 
In this case, law enforcement officials obtained 
and examined records that revealed the location of 
Carpenter’s cell phone over a four-month period.  Pet. 
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App. 4a-6a.  By obtaining and examining those rec-
ords, they were able to identify Carpenter’s wherea-
bouts at regular, frequent intervals—showing, for in-
stance, that he was “right where the first robbery was 
at the exact time of the robbery.”  Pet’r Br. 8 (quoting 
prosecutor’s statement to the jury).  This conduct fits 
squarely within the meaning of the word “search” as 
used in 1791.  The government “look[ed] over or 
through” and “examine[d] by inspection” Carpenter’s 
cell phone records “for the purpose of finding” his 
phone, and therefore him.  Webster, supra.  Scrutiniz-
ing those records to determine Carpenter’s wherea-
bouts was plainly an “act of seeking” and an “inquiry.”  
Johnson, supra. 
D.  The government argues that this is a situation 
“when a search is not a search.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32; 
see Cert. Opp. 16 (contending that the search of Car-
penter’s cell phone records was not “a Fourth Amend-
ment search”).  Relying on the “third-party doctrine,” 
the government maintains that Carpenter has “‘no le-
gitimate expectation of privacy’” in his cell phone rec-
ords because they contain “‘information he voluntarily 
turn[ed] over to third parties,’” Cert. Opp. 15 (quoting 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)), and 
that the Fourth Amendment therefore sets no limits 
on the government’s power to access and use those rec-
ords.  That argument rests on the definition of a 
“search” introduced in Katz v. United States, which ar-
tificially narrowed the word’s meaning to violations of 
“an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”  389 
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
This reliance on Katz denies “the people” their con-
stitutional birthright.  The Katz test, and its concomi-
tant rule that “secrecy [is] a prerequisite for privacy,” 
Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 
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lacks any basis in the text and history of the Fourth 
Amendment.  “A search is a search, even if it happens 
to disclose . . . . nothing of any great personal value[.]”  
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).  Instead of 
continuing to probe for “understandings that are rec-
ognized and permitted by society,” Minnesota v. 
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)), this Court should 
acknowledge that searches are searches, and should 
focus instead—as the text commands—on guarantee-
ing that the right of the people to be secure against 
unreasonable searches “shall not be violated.”  Cf. 
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 393 (1879) (“We may 
mystify any thing.  But if we take a plain view of the 
words of the Constitution, and give to them a fair and 
obvious interpretation, we cannot fail in most cases of 
coming to a clear understanding of its meaning.”).   
The Court has inclined toward this plain-meaning 
approach in the past.  Explaining that “warrantless 
visual surveillance of a home” has always been re-
garded as lawful, this Court has noted that the most 
obvious rationale for that rule does not depend on the 
meaning of “search.”  Rather, it is that “examining the 
portion of a house that is in plain public view, while it 
is a ‘search’ despite the absence of trespass, is not an 
‘unreasonable’ one under the Fourth Amendment.”  
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 (citing Minnesota, 525 U.S. at 104 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)).  That ap-
proach, more faithful to the Amendment’s text, also of-
fers a clear path forward in an age when technology 
and the public’s knowledge and expectations regarding 
that technology are constantly “in flux.”  Jones, 565 
U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  
By acknowledging that the government’s conduct 
in this case was a “search,” the Court can shift its focus 
away from a futile inquiry into how well the average 
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person understands cellular technology, and away 
from a fruitless quest to identify what “society” is pre-
pared to consider reasonable with regard to the pri-
vacy of cell site location information.  Instead, this 
Court can focus on the more straightforward question 
compelled by the text of the Fourth Amendment: Does 
granting law enforcement unfettered discretion to ac-
cess and analyze that information threaten “the right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches”? 
II. The Right of The People To Be Secure in 
Their Persons and Effects Against 
Unreasonable Searches Is Violated When 
the Government Has Unfettered Power To 
Track The People’s Whereabouts Through 
Their Cell Phone Records 
A.  Whether a search is “unreasonable” under the 
Fourth Amendment depends upon how it affects the 
security of “the people,” not merely the security of any 
individual person.  This is evident both from the 
Amendment’s text and from the history that gave rise 
to it—namely a widespread concern about the general 
insecurity caused by unconstrained authority to 
search.  
At the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption, 
the word “unreasonable” meant “not agreeable to rea-
son” and “greater than is fit; immoderate.”  Johnson, 
supra.  When used in political and legal discourse to 
describe government searches, the term had taken on 
a special meaning derived from the English legal tra-
dition, which equated to “against the reason of the 
common law.”  Donohue, supra, at 1270.  Because the 
common law, which was thought to embody natural 
reason, had rejected arbitrary search power under 
general warrants, see, e.g., 2 Matthew Hale, Pleas of 
the Crown 150 (1736) (“a general warrant to search in 
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all suspected places is not good”), the power to conduct 
general searches was “against reason,” or “unreasona-
ble.”  See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original 
Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 555 n.5 
(1999) (explaining how John Adams, the principal ar-
chitect of the Fourth Amendment, was influenced by 
James Otis’s condemnation of writs of assistance as 
“against reason,” a phrase that was “often converted to 
‘unreasonable’ [in] legal and political writings of the 
time”); see also Donohue, supra, at 1269-76. 
“Unreasonable searches” would therefore have 
been understood as those that shared the flaws of 
searches conducted under general warrants—searches 
not justified by good and sufficient reasons, that went 
further than those reasons called for, or that were ini-
tiated without any process of disciplined reason-giv-
ing.  See Gray, supra, at 160-65.  That these were the 
hallmarks of “unreasonable searches” is further illus-
trated by the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 
which indicates that “reasonable” searches are charac-
terized by a good and sufficient justification (“probable 
cause”), a process of ex ante reason-giving before a neu-
tral arbiter (“Oath or affirmation”), and limited discre-
tion (particularity).  
Moreover, although the Fourth Amendment con-
fers an individual right to be vindicated by those who 
themselves are subject to unlawful practices, Rakas, 
439 U.S. at 133-34, the “unreasonable searches” from 
which the Amendment protects the individual are 
those that violate “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”  U.S. 
Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).  By protecting the 
security of “the people” against unreasonable searches, 
the Framers made use of “a term of art employed in 
select parts of the Constitution” that “refers to a class 
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of persons who are part of a national community.”  Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265; see id. at 265-66 (con-
trasting the term “the people” with “the words ‘person’ 
and ‘accused’ used in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
regulating procedure in criminal cases”); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (explain-
ing that where “the people” is used in the Constitution, 
“the term unambiguously refers to all members of the 
political community, not an unspecified subset”).  
Compare Johnson, supra (defining “person” as an “in-
dividual or particular man or woman”), with id. (defin-
ing “people” as “a nation; those who compose a commu-
nity”). 
The Framers’ choice to guarantee a “right of the 
people” was a conscious one.  They borrowed this 
phrase from the 1776 state constitution of Pennsylva-
nia, which declared that “the people have a right to 
hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions 
free from search and seizure.”  Penn. Const. art. X 
(1776); see Davies, supra, at 677-78.  By contrast, the 
influential Massachusetts state constitution protected 
the rights of “[e]very subject” against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XIV 
(1780).  Although the Massachusetts provision, which 
flowed from the pen of John Adams, was in other re-
spects the primary model for the Fourth Amendment, 
see Davies, supra, at 678, the Framers notably de-
parted from Adams’s approach by protecting “the right 
of the people.”   
This formulation spoke more directly to “the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment,” which “was to protect 
the people of the United States against arbitrary ac-
tion by their own Government.”  Verdugo-Urquidez, 
494 U.S. at 266; see Jones, 565 U.S. at 416-17 (So-
tomayor, J., concurring) (referencing “the Fourth 
Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police 
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power . . . and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveil-
lance’” (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 
595 (1948))).  Advancing that purpose, the Amendment 
guards against the corroding effect on the liberty of the 
people as a whole that would occur if the state wielded 
unlimited, discretionary power to search and seize.  
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Uncontrolled search 
and seizure is one of the first and most effective weap-
ons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. . . . 
So a search against Brinegar’s car must be regarded 
as a search of the car of Everyman.”).  “The Fourth 
Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right 
of the people which ‘is basic to a free society.’”  Camara 
v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (quoting Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).   
The reasonableness of a search must be assessed, 
therefore, not only with regard to the impact it has on 
the privacy or property of the individual searched in 
that case.  Consideration must also be given, as the 
text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, to whether 
allowing the government to conduct that type of search 
would violate the security of “the people.”  See Luke M. 
Milligan, The Forgotten Right To Be Secure, 65 Has-
tings L.J. 713, 738-50 (2014) (explaining that the 
Fourth Amendment confers on the people a right to be 
“free from fear” of unreasonable searches).  Therefore, 
the question is whether the decision to engage in a 
type of search can be left to the unfettered discretion 
of government agents, free of “oversight from a coordi-
nate branch,” Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring), without compromising the security of the 
people as a whole. 
Historical context buttresses this textual infer-
ence.  Given the heritage of general warrants and 
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writs of assistance, the Founders feared giving the fed-
eral government “free rein to search for potential evi-
dence of criminal wrongdoing.”  Donohue, supra, at 
1194.  Such broad discretion was intolerable to the 
Founders precisely because of its oppressive impact on 
the political community, or “the people,” as a whole.  
See Gray, supra, at 146-56. 
In Wilkes v. Wood, for instance, the court con-
demned the unbounded discretion that general war-
rants conferred on the officers who executed them.  Be-
cause general warrants did not require agents to iden-
tify particular suspects or to inventory items to be 
seized, “a discretionary power [was] given to messen-
gers to search wherever their suspicions may chance 
to fall.”  98 Eng. Rep. at 498.  In Money v. Leach, an-
other of the general warrant cases, the court similarly 
declared, “It is not fit, that the receiving or judging of 
the information should be left to the discretion of the 
officer.”  97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088 (1765).   
Though few people actually were victims of 
searches conducted pursuant to general warrants, 
these courts emphasized that the mere existence of 
such warrants made the entire nation vulnerable to 
them—depriving the people of security against arbi-
trary and unreasonable searches.  As explained in 
Wilkes, the establishment of general search power 
“may affect the person and property of every man in 
this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of 
the subject.”  98 Eng. Rep. at 498.  In Entick v. Car-
rington, the court likewise warned that if general war-
rants were permitted, “no subject whatsoever is privi-
leged from this search . . . . the secret cabinets and bu-
reaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown 
open to the search and inspection of a messenger . . . . 
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and every house will fall under the power of a secre-
tary of state to be rummaged before proper conviction.”  
19 How. St. Tr. at 1063, 1071. 
In the eighteenth century, therefore, arbitrary and 
unfettered power to search was viewed as endangering 
the nation itself.  This existential threat, rather than 
the damage suffered by any individual person, was de-
scribed as the motivating force behind the verdict of 
the jury in Huckle v. Money: “[T]he small injury done 
to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his station 
and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that strik-
ing light in which the great point of law touching the 
liberty of the subject appeared to them at the trial; 
they saw a magistrate over all the King’s subjects, ex-
ercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and 
attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom[.]”  95 
Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (1763).  This general search power 
was all the more perilous because it was traditionally 
“used to stifle religious and political dissent.”  Milli-
gan, supra, at 749; see Cuddihy, supra, at 122-23; 
Donohue, supra, at 1208-10.  
Challenges to writs of assistance in the American 
colonies highlighted the same theme: discretionary 
search authority raised the specter of subjugation to 
arbitrary power for every citizen, imperiling the polit-
ical body as whole.  “In 1761, the patriot James Otis 
delivered a speech in Boston denouncing the use of 
writs of assistance” in Paxton’s Case.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2494.  Otis declared that the writ being sought was 
“a power that places the liberty of every man in the 
hands of every petty officer,” representing “the worst 
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of 
English liberty and the fundamental principles of 
law.”  Otis, supra.  Because the writ “is directed to 
every subject in the King’s dominions,” Otis declared, 
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“[e]very one with this writ may be a tyrant . . . . ac-
countable to no person for his doings.  Every man may 
reign secure in his petty tyranny.”  Id.  According to a 
young John Adams, who witnessed the fiery argument, 
“Otis’s speech was ‘the first scene of the first act of op-
position to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.  Then 
and there the child Independence was born.’”  Riley, 
134 S. Ct. at 2494 (citations omitted).   
Otis drew special attention to the danger of discre-
tionary search power in singling out targets based on 
personal animus or other improper motives.  As he put 
it, “Every man prompted by revenge, ill humor, or 
wantonness, to inspect the inside of his neighbor’s 
house, may get a Writ of Assistance.”  Otis, supra.  To 
show that the “wanton exercise of this power” was “not 
a chimerical suggestion of a heated brain,” Otis related 
an incident in which an officer, called to task by a 
judge and a constable for “breach of the Sabbath-day 
Acts,” retaliated against both by ordering the searches 
of their houses, “from the garret to the cellar,” for “un-
customed goods.”  Id.  A later commentator similarly 
warned that “if magistrates had a power of arresting 
men . . . merely upon their own suspicions, or pre-
tended suspicions, they might cause any person how 
innocent soever, to be thrown into prison whenever 
they thought fit.”  2 Francis Maseres, The Canadian 
Freeholder: In Three Dialogues Between an English-
man and a Frenchman 246 (1779). 
Early decisions in American courts likewise em-
phasized that the security of the people would be com-
promised if government officers were given broad, dis-
cretionary search powers.  See Frisbie v. Butler, 1 
Kirby 213, 215 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787) (finding 
“clearly illegal” a general warrant to search all places 
that “the complainant should suspect”).  Placing such 
21 
 
arbitrary power in the hands of state agents threat-
ened the security of the entire community.  See 
Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 43 (1814) (declaring 
unlawful “a warrant to search all suspected places” for 
stolen goods, because “every citizen of the United 
States within the jurisdiction of the justice to try for 
theft, was liable to be arrested”).  That threat was 
heightened because unbounded, discretionary search 
power inevitably invited abuse.  See id. at 44 (“It would 
open a door for the gratification of the most malignant 
passions, if such process issued by a magistrate should 
skreen [an officer] from damages.”); Bell v. Clapp, 10 
Johns. 263, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (explaining that 
the constitutional checks imposed on the operation of 
search warrants arose from “a strong jealousy of the 
abuses incident to them”). 
Considering the impact on the security of “the peo-
ple” as a whole if the government were given unfet-
tered power to search is not only faithful to the Amend-
ment’s text and history, it is also capable of ensuring 
that Fourth Amendment rights are not left “at the 
mercy of advancing technology.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.  
The digital tools employed by government agents to-
day have gone far beyond “augmenting the sensory fac-
ulties bestowed upon them at birth,” Knotts, 460 U.S. 
at 282, and increasingly exploit the fact that “people 
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to 
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks,” Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring).  Modern technology, “by making available at a 
relatively low cost . . . a substantial quantum of inti-
mate information about any person whom the Govern-
ment, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track,” id. 
at 416, has fundamentally changed the state’s capacity 
to monitor the activities of the people.  That develop-
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ment, if left unchecked, will “alter the relationship be-
tween citizen and government in a way that is inimical 
to democratic society.”  Id.  The Fourth Amendment is 
directed against this threat and demands checks suffi-
cient to guarantee that “the right of the people to be 
secure . . . shall not be violated.” 
B.  Protecting the security of “the people” against 
unreasonable searches requires considering more than 
simply the type of information gathered in a search, 
and whether it has been “knowingly expose[d] to the 
public,” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, or “third parties,” 
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.  Consideration must also be 
given to the means by which the government gathers 
the information and the overall effect on the security 
of “the people” if government agents were to enjoy un-
fettered discretion to employ those means. See David 
Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Pri-
vacy, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 62, 101-02 (2013).   
To illustrate, consider the difference between hu-
man surveillance and modern tracking technologies.  
It may be perfectly reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment to leave decisions to conduct human sur-
veillance to the unfettered discretion of law enforce-
ment.  That is because human surveillance is inher-
ently limited in scope (officers can be in only one place 
at a time), difficult to conduct on a broad scale (there 
are only so many police officers), and thus relatively 
costly in time and money.  See Gray & Citron, supra, 
at 124-25.  These features of human surveillance mean 
that it is seldom used on a grand scale or for extended 
periods of time, and even then only for compelling rea-
sons.  Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in 
the judgment).  That, in turn, means that leaving the 
decision to conduct human surveillance to the unfet-
tered discretion of government agents is unlikely to 
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threaten “the right of the people to be secure . . .  
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”   
By contrast, consider technologies such as global 
positioning system (“GPS”) and radio-frequency iden-
tification (“RFID”) monitoring.  Tracking programs 
that use these technologies have extraordinary capac-
ity in terms of scope, because GPS and RFID chips are 
commonly embedded in personal electronic devices, 
computers, cars, driver’s licenses, passports, credit 
cards, and even clothes.  See, Gray, supra at 23-30.  
These programs are also highly scalable, because they 
can be automated and monitored by computers, and 
are increasingly inexpensive as well.  See Jones, 565 
U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 429 
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  Together, these 
features make granting government agents unfettered 
access to GPS or RFID technologies a pernicious threat 
to the security of the people against unreasonable 
searches, because those technologies can easily facili-
tate programs of broad and indiscriminate surveil-
lance, condemning each of us to live in fear that we 
could be surveilled at any time or all the time.   
This Court has acknowledged that the distinction 
illustrated by this example might make a difference 
under the Fourth Amendment.  In Knotts, the Court 
held that it was constitutionally permissible for nar-
cotics officers to visually track the public movements 
of a suspect without a warrant, even when those ef-
forts were aided by a relatively primitive radio beeper 
device.  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277, 285.  In doing so, how-
ever, the Court emphasized “the limited use which the 
government made of the signals” from the beeper, and 
that the technology merely enhanced the “efficiency” 
of what was still a resource-intensive effort to track a 
particular suspect’s vehicle during a single journey.  
Id. at 278 (noting that the pursuing officers “lost the 
24 
 
signal from the beeper” at one point and were forced to 
call upon “the assistance of a monitoring device located 
in a helicopter”). 
As the Knotts Court explained, the limitations of 
the beeper technology used there meant that granting 
officers unfettered access did not raise any danger of 
“‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this 
country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervi-
sion.’”  Id. at 283-84 (quoting respondent’s brief).  Pres-
ciently, the Court promised that “if such dragnet-type 
law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, 
there will be time enough then to determine whether 
different constitutional principles may be applicable.”  
Id. at 284; see Jones, 565 U.S. at 412 (suggesting that 
while continuous visual observation of a suspect’s 
movements over a four-week period is constitutionally 
permissible, “[i]t may be that achieving the same re-
sult through electronic means . . . is an unconstitu-
tional invasion of privacy”). 
The threat of dragnet surveillance that was mere 
speculation in Knotts is reality today.  Electronic 
devices that are increasingly essential to modern life 
now generate, as a matter of course, a perpetual record 
of a person’s movements, “mak[ing] long-term 
monitoring relatively easy and cheap.”  Jones, 565 U.S. 
at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  What is 
more, the government is often spared the burden of 
conducting the monitoring itself because it can simply 
reap the fruits of routine data gathering by third 
parties.  As a result, the state’s ability to track its 
citizens is no longer constrained by the need to single 
out particular suspects in advance, or to invest the 
time and resources that prolonged surveillance 
demands. 
These considerations reveal why it is not “incon-
gruous” to impose constitutional constraints on the use 
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of GPS technology to monitor a car’s movements, “for 
even a brief time,” while allowing the police broader 
discretion to “follow the same car for a much longer 
period using unmarked cars and aerial assistance.”  Id. 
at 425 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  The 
need to devote significant time and resources to any 
long-term surveillance is precisely why the people can 
be secure in their persons and effects against the dan-
ger that police will track their movements using tradi-
tional methods without good reason to do so.  See id. at 
429 (“In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections 
of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, 
but practical.  Traditional surveillance for any ex-
tended period of time was difficult and costly and 
therefore rarely undertaken.”).  By contrast, GPS tech-
nology enables the police to generate “a precise, com-
prehensive record” of a car’s movements with little ef-
fort.  Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  The dis-
parity becomes even greater when police can obtain 
that comprehensive record from third-party commer-
cial entities well after the events in question have 
taken place.  Such is the case with cell site location in-
formation. 
Modern cell phones “are now such a pervasive and 
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor 
from Mars might conclude they were an important 
feature of human anatomy.”  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484; 
cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) 
(“Cell phone and text message communications are so 
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be 
essential means or necessary instruments for self-
expression, even self-identification.”).  By 2014, 
“nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report[ed] 
being within five feet of their phones most of the time.”  
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.   
26 
 
As the government acknowledges, “a cell-phone 
user must reveal his general location to a cell tower in 
order for the cellular service provider to connect a call.”  
Cert. Opp. 15 (emphasis added).  Anyone who uses this 
essential tool of modern life has no choice but to accept 
the creation of a continuous digital trail of her 
locations and movements.  Perversely, the government 
argues that this inevitability is why the Fourth 
Amendment should place no limits on the 
government’s acquisition of that digital trail.  See id. 
at 16 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 745).  That position, 
which permits “technology to erode the privacy 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment,” Kyllo, 533 
U.S. at 34, is utterly backwards if one is concerned 
about safeguarding the security of the people against 
the unreasonable and arbitrary use of state power. 
When Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on the 
method employed by the government and its potential 
effects on the security of the people—not just on the 
information obtained—it becomes clear why certain 
high-tech means of conducting searches must be 
subject to constitutional regulation even though 
searches for the same information using traditional 
means are not.  Government officers can follow people 
from place to place in search of information about their 
activities and whereabouts without threatening the 
security of the people because practical obstacles make 
it difficult to use this method in excess.  But the rise of 
modern cell phones, “based on technology nearly 
inconceivable just a few decades ago,” Riley, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2484, has given the government ready means to 
conduct “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen 
of this country.”  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283.  Unfettered 
government access to these technologies, being 
inimical to “a society which chooses to dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance,” 
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Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, is constitutionally 
unreasonable.  “The fact that equivalent information 
could sometimes be obtained by other means does not 
make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2. 
Limitless access to location data is all the more un-
reasonable because of its potential to reveal “politi-
cal and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”  
Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
“Awareness that the Government may be watching 
chills associational and expressive freedoms,” and 
“the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble 
data that reveal private aspects of identity is suscepti-
ble to abuse.”  Id.  These concerns echo those of the 
Founding generation, which had learned that discre-
tionary search power, when lodged in the state, is 
apt to be directed against disfavored ideas.  See supra 
at 19. 
C.  The “imprecise nature” of cell site location in-
formation, Cert. Opp. 25, does not ameliorate the prob-
lems discussed above.  Even when the technology used 
in a particular case is “relatively crude,” the rules this 
Court adopts “must take account of more sophisticated 
systems that are already in use or in development.”  
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36.  The precision of cellular lo-
cation data is improving every day.  See Pet’r Br. 27-
29.  And in any event, the technology used in this case 
proved fully capable of establishing Carpenter’s prox-
imity to particular places at particular times.  See Pet. 
App. 6a.  
More problematic still is that the government, in 
asking this Court to distinguish between GPS data 
and the location records used here, introduces “vexing” 
line-drawing problems akin to those that worried the 
Court in Jones.  565 U.S. at 412-13.  The government 
does not explain how precise is too precise, and indeed 
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“offers no practical guidance for the application of this 
standard.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39.  To the extent the 
government suggests that this Court rely on such 
distinctions to defer consideration of the weighty 
questions raised by digital location tracking, the 
government merely asks the Court to perpetuate 
uncertainty, thereby leaving the people insecure 
against the threat of unreasonable searches posed by 
these technologies. 
III. The Stored Communications Act’s Protec-
tions Are Inadequate 
The Fourth Amendment sets out an imperative: 
the right of the people to be secure against unreasona-
ble searches “shall not be violated.”  To meet that com-
mand, the Amendment compels the imposition of lim-
its on the government’s ability to deploy certain types 
of searches.  The prime example of such a constraint is 
found in the Amendment itself, which specifies that 
“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
By requiring probable cause—sworn to by oath or 
affirmation, and evaluated by a neutral magistrate—
along with particularity regarding the place to be 
searched, the Warrant Clause “prevents the issue of 
warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact,” 
promoting the Amendment’s “purpose to protect 
against all general searches,” which are inherently 
“obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty.”  Go-
Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 
(1931); see Davies, supra, at 576-77 (the Amendment 
“did not simply seek to provide a post-intrusion rem-
edy,” but rather “adopted a preventive strategy . . . pro-
hibiting even the issuance of a too-loose warrant”); 
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Milligan, supra, at 746-50 (criticism of general war-
rants focused less on their execution and more on their 
“issuance,” “existence,” and “power”).  Together, these 
safeguards protect the people from being “secure only 
in the discretion of police officers . . . engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”  
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) 
(quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14). 
Similar protections are needed here, given the se-
rious threat that government access to cell site loca-
tion information poses to the security of the people.  
See supra at 24-27.  Although the SCA includes re-
quirements that in some ways resemble those of the 
Warrant Clause, its protections fall short given the for-
midable power of location data as a tool for monitoring 
the activities of the people. 
The SCA permits the government to obtain cell 
site location information if it offers “specific and artic-
ulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe” that the records “are relevant and material 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d).  It does not require the government to limit 
the records sought, beyond the general requirement of 
relevance to an investigation, or to demonstrate prob-
able cause, or to provide a sworn statement affirming 
the facts set forth in the government’s application.     
These standards fail to impose sufficient con-
straints on the use of cell site location information to 
conduct searches.  Mere relevance to an investigation 
does not adequately constrain the scope of the data the 
government can obtain under the SCA, either in quan-
tity or in duration.  That is especially true because of 
the potential usefulness, or at least perceived useful-
ness, of exploiting such data in a dragnet-like search 
for information about potential suspects.  See Cert. 
Opp. 25 (arguing that cell site location information is 
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“particularly valuable during the early stages of an in-
vestigation, when the police [may] lack probable cause 
and are confronted with multiple suspects” (quoting 
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 
2015))).  For example, the loose relevance standard of 
the SCA could permit widespread surveillance of all 
cell phones in a “high crime” area where the govern-
ment is investigating a rash of ongoing offenses.  
Indeed, under a similar legal standard—requiring 
“a statement of facts showing that there are reasona-
ble grounds to believe that the [records] sought are rel-
evant to an authorized investigation,” 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861(b)(2)(B), multiple federal district court judges 
over a period of years approved the indiscriminate na-
tionwide collection of calling records because, the gov-
ernment asserted, bulk analysis of such records could 
reveal “connections between known and unknown in-
ternational terrorist operatives.”  In re F.B.I. App. for 
an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 
13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 
2013); accord ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 
746 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting argument that the col-
lection “is too broad and contains too much irrelevant 
information” to meet the statutory standard, 
“[b]ecause without all the data points, the Government 
cannot be certain it connected the pertinent ones”), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 785 F.3d 787 
(2d Cir. 2015).  Regardless of whether those rulings 
were correct in the context of the surveillance program 
at issue, they reveal the elasticity of a standard that 
requires only relevance to an investigation. 
Even on the facts of this case, the overbreadth of 
collection that the SCA permits is apparent.  The gov-
ernment suspected Carpenter of involvement in a 
number of store robberies.  Pet. App. 3a.  But rather 
than limiting its request “to only the days on which the 
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robberies occurred,” the government sought—and the 
court approved—the acquisition of records showing his 
locations and movements over five months (152 days), 
which ultimately yielded more than four months’ 
worth of data (127 days).  Pet. 4-5 & n.2; see Pet. App. 
52a.  The records were used in court, however, only to 
establish that Carpenter was near the sites of four rob-
beries.  Pet. App. 6a. 
Moreover, by the time the government requested 
Carpenter’s records, it seems already to have had 
probable cause to arrest him and seek his cell phone 
records for the specific times of the robberies.  See Pet. 
App. 3a (explaining that a fellow suspect had confessed 
and given information about his accomplices and their 
telephone numbers); cf. Pet. App. 5a (indicating that 
ultimately seven of Carpenter’s associates testified 
against him at trial); Cert. Opp. 6 (“The government 
also introduced videotapes and eyewitness testimony 
placing petitioner near the relevant robbery scenes.”).  
Given this, it would not have unduly burdened the gov-
ernment to obtain a traditional warrant for Carpen-
ter’s cell phone records, as the SCA also permits.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A); cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 
(“Recent technological advances” have “made the pro-
cess of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient.”).  By 
helping prevent unnecessarily broad data requests, 
and by ensuring that all requests are justified by facts 
independently evaluated by a magistrate under a 
standard of probable cause, such a requirement would 
“have the salutary effect of ensuring that use of [loca-
tion data] is not abused,” Karo, 468 U.S. at 717, 
thereby guaranteeing the security of the people 
against unreasonable searches conducted using cell 
site location information. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
  Respectfully submitted,  
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